Despite this expectation of infringement of acquired rights, the agreement does not have a fair mechanism to address, on a case-by-case basis, the potential conflicts that will undoubtedly arise from its implementation and thus protect “the innocent.” Should the Parties endeavour to refine this Agreement, the inclusion of such a mechanism would help to allay the concerns of the Court of Justice. On the basis of the expected effects of the retroactive provision on seniority for established employees, the Tribunal finds that the agreement is at the origin of the “unusual adverse effects” envisaged by Franks and that it is not “fair”. The United States contens that this case does not meet the threshold of “unusual adverse effects” necessary for the rejection of the agreement. The United States relies on the following numerical data: (1) a maximum of 15 out of 90 firefighters (38% of the current workforce); and a maximum of 15 out of 126 police officers (40% of the current workforce) recruited since 1987 are at risk of being “pushed” due to retroactive regulation; and (2) only 73 of Suau`s 201 opponents are “vulnerable” to the population. These figures are misleading. The overwhelming number of established workers who strongly oppose the provision provision in the proposed agreement leads the Tribunal to conclude in an inescapable manner that there is a good chance that an atmosphere of hostility and hostility will develop between the established staff and the incoming class of victims. Thus, the Court finds that the negative effects of the provision go beyond the risky effects; it will penetrate these obviously closely related divisions. As regards the `practical realities and necessities inevitably inherent in the reconciliation of competing interests`, the Court finds that that agreement does not embody the `particular mixture of what is necessary, just and what is feasible`. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 375, 97 p. Ct.
in 1875. Therefore, the Court of Justice does not agree with the proposed settlement agreement. This reason came before the court at a hearing held on 11 August 1994 to determine the fairness of a proposed settlement agreement between the applicant United States of America (“United States”) and the defendant city of Hialeah, its mayor, the personnel committee and the personnel director (together the “city”). For the following reasons, the Court of Justice submitted the approval of the proposed settlement agreement. On June 8, 1994, the Tribunal granted the joint request of the United States and the City to include an agreement and a settlement agreement and provisionally approved the agreement until a fairness hearing in that case, scheduled for August 11, 1994.  The Notice of Consultation and the proposed transaction were published and all objections to this transaction had to be submitted no later than thirty (30) days prior to the scheduled date of the hearing.  In assessing the accuracy of a settlement agreement, the Court must take into account the nature of the dispute and the objectives to be fulfilled by such an agreement. United States, City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir.1981). In addition, the Tribunal should “focus on the terms of the agreement and take into account the merits only to the extent that they are relevant to determining the likely outcome of the dispute, and thus give an indication of the fairness and equity of the transaction”. Moore v.
City of San Jose, 615 F.2d 1265, 1271 (9th Cir.1980). Where the transaction imposes full relief in the form of retroactive seniority, jurisdictions should carefully consider the issues and determine that they cannot approve the proposed transaction agreement *613 as of that date. Firstly, the Court of Justice notes that the agreement should not be approved against the objections of the non-contracting parties. . . .